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Abstract
The halting problem is considered to be an essential part of the
theoretical background to computing. That halting is not in general
computable has been “proved” in many text books and taught on many
computer science courses, and is supposed to illustrate the limits of
computation. However, Eric Hehner has a dissenting view, in which
the specification of the halting problem is called into question.
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1 Introduction
In his invited paper [1] at The First International Conference on Unifying
Theories of Programming, Eric Hehner dedicates a section to the proof of the
halting problem, claiming that it entails an unstated assumption. He agrees
that the halt test program cannot exist, but concludes that this is due to
an inconsistency in its specification. Hehner has republished his arguments
using less formal notation in [2].
The halting problem is considered to be an essential part of the theoretical
background to computing. That halting is not in general computable has
been “proved” in many text books and taught on many computer science
courses to illustrate the limits of computation. Hehner’s claim is therefore
extraordinary. Nevertheless he is an eminent and highly creative computer
scientist whose opinions reward careful attention. In judging Hehner’s thesis
we take the view that to illustrate the limits of computation we need a
consistent specification which cannot be implemented.
For our discussion we use a guarded command language for sequential state
based programs. Our language includes named procedures and named en-
quiries and tests. These constructs may have input parameters. Enquiries
and tests allow assignment only to their own local variables; they are thus
side effect free. They are used in expressions, where they represent the value
returned by the enquiry. Procedures must be invoked as program statements.
With the text of each program P we associate a unique number ⌈P⌉, known
as the program’s encoding, which will stand for the program when we want
to use that program as data, e.g. when passing one program to another as
an argument.
The halting problem is typically stated as follows. Given a Turing machine
equivalent (TME) language there is no halt test program H (⌈P⌉,X ) which
will tell us, for arbitrary program P and data X , whether P will halt when
applied to X .
Hehner simplifies this, saying there is no need to consider a program applied
to data, as data passed to a program could always be incorporated within
the program. So his version is that there is no halt test H (⌈P⌉) which tells
us, for an arbitrary program P , whether execution of P will halt.
Where context allows us to distinguish P from ⌈P⌉, we may allow ourselves
to write P instead of ⌈P⌉. For example we will write H (P) and H (P ,X ) etc
rather than H (⌈P⌉), H (⌈P⌉,X ).
The proof that H cannot be implemented goes as follows. Under the as-
sumption that we have implemented H , and that we have a program Loop
which is a non-terminating loop, we ask whether the following program will
halt:
S =̂ if H (S ) then Loop end
Now within S , H must halt and provide a true or false judgement for the
halting of S . If it judges that S will halt, then S will enter a non-terminating
Loop. If it judges that S will not halt, then S will halt.
Since H cannot pass a correct judgement for S , we must withdraw our as-
sumption that there is an implementation of H . Thus halting behaviour
cannot, in general, be computed. 
In this paper we will not be satisfied with this proof and will look in more
detail at the specification of H . If we can specify H there will be some interest
in proving it is not implementable. If we cannot specify it we have a problem:
we won’t be able to say formally what it is that cannot be implemented.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we verify Hehner’s simplifi-
cation of the halting problem. In section 3 we make some general remarks
on unbounded memory calculations and connections between halt tests and
mathematical proofs. We also show that failure to halt is observable for
computations with fixed memory resources. In section 4 we consider a halt
test that is required to work only for a small set of stateless programs, and
we find we can still use the same proof that we cannot have a halt test. We
examine the specification of the halt test for this limited scenario in detail,
and we describe an implementation of an amended halt test that is allowed
to report non-halting by an error message if the test itself cannot terminate.
In section 5 we perform a semantic analysis of S , taking its definition as a
recursive equation, and conclude that its defining equation has no solution.
S does not exist as a conceptual object, and neither does our putative halt
test H .
The halting problem is generally attributed to Turing’s paper on Computable
Numbers [3], but the connection is slightly less direct than this implies. In
an appendix we briefly describe Turing’s paper and how the halting problem
emerged from it. We give an example, from Turing’s paper, of an uncom-
putable function which has a consistent specification.
2 Hehner’s simplification of the halting prob-
lem
Normally the halting problem is discussed in terms of a halt test taking data
D and program P and reporting whether P halts when applied to D .
Hehner’s simplified halt test takes a program P and reports whether it halts.
We refer to the first of these halt tests as H2, since it takes two arguments,
and the second as H .
To verify Hehner’s simplification of the halting problem we show that any
test that can be performed by H2 can also be performed by H , and any test
that can be performed by H can also be performed by H2.
Proof Given procedures P0 and P1(x ), and tests H (p) and H2(p, d) where
H (P0) reports whether P0 halts, and H2(P1, d) reports whether P1(d) halts:
then if we define an operation T =̂ P1(d) the test H2(P1, d) can be per-
formed using H as H (T ).
and if we define an operation U (x ) =̂ P0, where the name x is chosen to be
non-free in P0, the test H (P0) can be performed by H2 as H2(U , d). 
3 Some notes on halting analysis
Fermat’s last theorem states that for any integer n > 2 there are no integers
a, b, c such that:
an + bn = cn
Since 1995, when AndrewWiles produced a proof 150 pages long, the theorem
is recognised as true.
Given a program Fermat which searches exhaustively for a counter example
and halts when it finds one, and a halt test H we could have proved the
theorem by executing the test H (Fermat) This would tell us the program
Fermat does not halt, implying that the search for a counter example will
continue forever, in other words that no counter example exists and the
theorem is therefore true.
The Goldbach conjecture, which states that every even integer can be ex-
pressed as the sum of two primes (we include 1 in the prime numbers). This
is an unproved conjecture, but so far no counter example has been found,
although it has been checked for all numbers up to and somewhat beyond
1018. Given a program Goldbach which searches exhaustively for a solution
to the Goldbach conjecture and terminates if it finds one, and halt test H
for Goldbach, we could decide the truth of the conjecture by executing the
test H (Goldbach).
The programs Fermat and Goldbach would have unbounded memory require-
ments, as they must be able to deal with increasingly large integers.
When considering the halting problem we normally assume idealised com-
puters with unbounded memory. But suppose we have a program that is to
be run on a computer with n bits of memory. Its state transitions can take
it to at most 2n different states. We can solve the halting problem for this
program by providing an additional n bits of memory and using this as a
counter. When we have counted 2n state transitions and the program has
not halted, we know it will never halt because it must have, at some point,
revisited a previous state.
Of course the question being answered by the proof, on the one hand, and the
monitoring of execution, on the other, are not the same. Monitoring execu-
tion does not require the “twisted self reference” (Hehner’s term) that occurs
in our proposed program S . There is a separation between the monitor, as
observer, and the executing program, as the thing observed.
4 A halt test for a limited set of programs
The conventional view of the halting problem proof is that it shows a uni-
versal halt test is impossible in a TME language. In this section we seek to
clarify the inconsistency of the halt test specification by limiting our discus-
sions to a small set of state free programs.
Consider first the set L0 = { ⌈Skip⌉ , ⌈Loop⌉ }
L0 is a set for which we can specify a halt test H0. The specification is
consistent because it has a model:
{ ⌈Skip⌉ 7→ true , ⌈Loop⌉ 7→ false }
Now we become ambitious and wish to consider the set:
L1 = {⌈Skip⌉, ⌈Loop⌉, ⌈S⌉}, with a halt test H .
Our definition of S is still:
S =̂ if H (S ) then Loop end
and our specification for H is:
For p ∈ L1, H (p) is true if execution of p halts, and false otherwise.
But what is the model for H ?
{ ⌈Skip⌉ 7→ true , ⌈Loop⌉ 7→ false, ⌈S⌉ 7→ ? }
Our model must map S to either true or false, but whichever is chosen will be
wrong. We have no model for H , so it cannot have a consistent specification.
We have reduced the halting problem to this limited scenario so we can
attempt to write out the model of halting, but exactly the same argument
applies to halting in a TME language.
In this limited scenario we can make the same “proof” that halting is uncom-
putable that we used for TME languages in the introduction.
4.1 Experiments with code
Setting aside formal analysis for a moment, let us see what our programming
intuition can tell us about the strange program
S =̂ if H (S ) then Loop end .
And let us see if we can tweak H so that S can actually be implemented.
Although the halt test is unable to tell us this, S looks as if it will NOT
terminate, because when H (S ) is executed within S , it will be faced with
again deciding the result of H (S ) with no additional information to help it. S
will not terminate, but this is because the halt test invoked within it cannot
terminate.
There is no reason, however, why the halt test cannot terminate in other
situations, or why failure to halt cannot be reported via an error message
when the halt test itself cannot halt.
We now consider a halt test H1(p) for use with the set
L2 = { ⌈Skip⌉, ⌈Loop⌉, ⌈S1⌉ }
where: S1 =̂ if H1(S1) then Loop end
For p ∈ L2, H1(p) returns a true flag if execution of p halts. If execution
of p does not halt return a false flag, unless H1 has been invoked within S1,
in which case report an error.
Here is the error report when S1 is invoked.
Error at S1
Cannot terminate
reported at H1 in file ...
Implementation of H1 requires it to determine whether it is being invoked
from within S1. In a typical compiled sequential language this information
can be deduced from the return address for the call to H , and the symbol
table, which contains information that will tell us whether this return address
is within the code body of S1. However, this information is not usually
directly accessible in the language, so we will suppose we have written at
assembly code level a test InS1 which will report whether the operation that
invokes it has been invoked from within S1.
We also assume an error handler Error(s) which is invoked when an error
condition is detected. It prints the string s as an error message, and handles
the error. Formally this a form of non-termination.
In defining H1 we build into it the conclusions we deduced above: S1 does
not terminate, but H1 cannot report this in the normal way if it has been
invoked from within S1.
H1(p) =̂
if p = Skip then return(TRUE )
elseif p = Loop then return(FALSE )
elseif p = S1 then
if InS1 then Error(“Cannot terminate
′′) else return(FALSE ) end
else Error(“Invalid program ′′)
end
This illustrates that the problem is not that halting of S1 cannot be com-
puted, but that the result cannot always be communicated in the specified
way. Requiring H (or in this case H1) to halt in all cases is too strong, as it
may be the halt test itself that cannot halt.
5 Proof and paradox
In [1] the halting problem is compared to the Barber’s paradox. “The barber,
who is a man, shaves all and only the men in the village who do not shave
themselves. Who shaves the barber?” If we assume he shaves himself, we see
we must be wrong, because the barber shaves only men who do not shave
themselves. If we assume he does not shave himself, we again see we must
be wrong, because the barber shaves all men who do not shave themselves.
The statement of the paradox seems to tell us something about the village,
but it does not, since conceptually no such village can exist.
In a similar way, the program S which we have used in the halting problem
proof, does not exist as a conceptual object so what we say about it can be
paradoxical.
To argue this formally we use the following termination rule:
trm(g) ⇒ ( trm( if g then T end ) ⇔ ¬ g ∨ ( g ⇒ trm(T ) ) ) (1)
And we specify the result of applying H to program P as:
H (P) ⇔ trm(P)
Bearing in mind that trm(H ) is true by the specification of H , we argue:
trm(S ) ⇔ “ by definition of S ”
trm( if H (S ) then Loop end ) ⇔ “ by rule (1) above ”
¬ H (S ) ∨ ( H (S ) ⇒ trm(Loop) ) ⇔ “ property of Loop ”
¬ H (S ) ∨ ( H (S ) ⇒ false ) ⇔ “ logic ”
¬ H (S ) ∨ ¬ H (S ) ⇔ “ logic ”
¬ H (S ) ⇔ “ specification of H ”
¬ trm(S )
So we have proved that trm(S ) ⇔ ¬ trm(S ). This tells us that S does not
exist as a conceptual object, let alone as a program. We have seen in the
previous section that by relaxing the specification of H we can implement
the same textual definition of S , so the non existence of S proved here can
only be due to the specification of H being inconsistent.
The proof of the halting problem assumes a universal halt test exists and
then provides S as an example of a program that the test cannot handle.
But S is not a program at all. It is not even a conceptual object, and this
is due to inconsistencies in the specification of the halting function. H also
doesn’t exist as a conceptual object, and we have already seen this from a
previous argument where we show it has no model.
6 Conclusions
The idea of a universal halting test seems reasonable, but cannot be for-
malised as a consistent specification. It has no model and does not exist as
a conceptual object. Assuming its conceptual existence leads to a paradox.
The halting problem is universally used in university courses on Computer
Science to illustrate the limits of computation. Hehner claims the halting
problem is misconceived. Presented with a claim that a universal halt test
cannot be implemented we might ask – what is the specification of this test
that cannot be implemented? The informal answer, that there is no program
H which can be used to test the halting behaviour of an arbitrary program,
cannot be formalised as a consistent specification.
The program S , used as example of a program whose halting cannot be
analysed, observes its own halting behaviour and does the opposite. Hehner
calls this a “twisted self reference”. It violates the key scientific principle of,
where possible, keeping what we are observing free from the effects of the
observation.
To better understand Hehner’s thesis we have verified his simplification of
the halting problem, and studied a set of three stateless programs and a halt
test, to which exactly the same proof can be applied.
Our programming intuition tells us that S will not terminate because when
H (S ) is invoked within S , H will not terminate. However, we cannot require
H to return a value to report this, because that would require it to terminate!
We provide a programming example based on a a halt test for a small set of
programs, where we resolve this by allowing the option for the halt test to
report via an error message when it finds itself in this situation. However,
we can require that the halt test should always halt in other situations. The
problem, in our little scenario for which the halting problem proof can still
be applied, is not the uncomputability of halting!
We have also performed a semantic analysis which confirms that the halt test
and S do not exist as conceptual objects.
Having a halt test for specific unbounded memory computations, such as
those that search for counter examples to Fermat’s last theorem and the
Goldbach conjecture, involves no inconsistency, and would give us enormous
mathematical powers, but this has nothing to do with the halting paradox.
We have found nothing to make us disagree with Hehner’s analysis. Defenders
of the status quo might say – so the halt test can’t even be conceived, so
it doesn’t exist. What’s the difference? Hehner says that uncomputability
should refer to what can be defined (specified) but not implemented. Turing’s
uncomputable sequence β provides such an example, and is discussed in the
appendix.
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Appendix: Turing’s 1936 paper and the halting problem
On computable numbers, with a contribution to the Entscheidungsproblem,
Turing’s paper from 1936 [3] is cited as the source of the halting problem, but
it does not use the actual term “halting”. The paper captures Hilbert’s notion
of an “effective procedure” by defining “computing machines”, consisting of
finite state machines with an infinite tape, which are similar to what we now
call Turing machines but with significant differences. He uses such machines
to define all numbers with a finite representation as “computable numbers”,
with the fractional part of such a number being represented by a machine
that computes an infinite binary sequence. The description of these machines
is finite, so numbers such as pi, which are computable to any desired accuracy,
can have a finite representation in terms of the machines that compute them.
Turing’s idea of a computer calculating pi would perhaps have been of a
human being at a desk, performing the calculation, and now and then writing
down another significant figure. His “computing machines” are supposed
to continue generating the bits of their computable sequence indefinitely,
but faulty machines may fail to do so, and these are not associated with
computable sequences.
The computing machines that generate the computable sequences can be
arranged in order using an encoding method which yields a different number
for each computing machine.
The computable sequences define binary fractions that can be computed.
Turing’s contribution to the Entscheidungsproblem is in defining a binary
sequence β that cannot be computed. Let M (n) be the nth computable se-
quence, and define the sequence:
β(n) = if M (n)(n) = 1 then 0 else 1 end .
By a diagonalisation argument β is not one of the computable sequences: it is
definable but not computable. The link with halting comes from asking why
it cannot be computed, the reason being that although we can talk about
the sequence of computing machines that generate infinite binary sequences
of 0’s and 1’s we cannot distinguish these from machines which have the
correct syntactic properties but which do not generate infinite sequences. So
we cannot compute which of the computable sequences is the nth computable
sequence because we cannot distinguish good and bad computing machines.
The first reference to the “halting problem” I have been able to find comes
in M Davis Computability and Unsolvability, from 1958. By then Turing
machines had taken their current form and were required to halt before the
output was read from their tape. He credits Turing’s 1936 paper as the source
of the problem’s formulation.
A proof using a computing mechanism which enquires about its own halting
behaviour and then does the opposite appears in M Minsky, Computation.
Finite and infinite machines, from 1967. This proof, with reference to Min-
sky, is also given in R Feynman Lectures on computation.
Text books that use a programming notation (rather than Turing machines)
to discuss the halting problem include Computer Science, a modern introduc-
tion By L Goldschlager and M Lister, from the Prentice Hall red book series,
Introduction to Computer Science by V Zwass, and Discrete Mathematics
with Proof by E Godssett.
